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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
Roger Knight appeals from the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Slippery Rock University and denial of his motion for summary judgment on his 
discrimination claim.  He contends that the University retaliated against him for engaging 
in protected activity when, after separate federal discrimination claims were filed against 
the University, he accessed multiple employees’ personal computer files.  The District 
Court held that he was not engaged in a protected activity and that, because he failed to 
demonstrate that the University’s legitimate basis for termination—violation of the 
computer access policy—was pretextual under the McDonnell Douglas test, this claim 
could not succeed.  We will affirm.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
 
 Roger Knight was employed by Slippery Rock University (“the University”) from 
1997 until his termination in March 2014.  Knight held various positions within the 
University’s police department before becoming Parking Manager in 2012.  
 In late 2011, two employees of the Slippery Rock Police Department, Caitlin 
Corrigan and Koah Pentz, filed EEOC Charges of Discrimination against the University, 
alleging that Knight discriminated and retaliated against them.  Corrigan alleged 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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discrimination on the basis of her sex, while Pentz alleged discrimination on the basis of 
his Native American heritage and religious beliefs.  Both filed complaints in federal 
court.  In January 2013, the University’s internal legal counsel sent Knight letters 
instructing him to preserve and maintain all information he had in his possession, 
custody, or control relating to the Corrigan and Pentz lawsuits.  Knight received letters 
again in December 2013 reminding him of his ongoing obligations regarding the 
litigation holds. 
 Between June 2012 and January 2014, he accessed a number of individual 
computer files belonging to Officers Corrigan, Pentz, Frank Davis, and Assistant Chief of 
Police Windy Stafford.  These individual files, saved on the University’s server, are only 
accessible to administrators.  Knight’s account had administrator rights and permissions.  
Knight stated that he accessed these files because he was “told to provide information 
that would help [the University] win this case.”  A. 325.  He further claimed that he 
accessed the files of Officer Davis and Assistant Chief Stafford for the purpose of 
looking for documents to bolster the University’s defense.  He believed that he “was 
going to be [the University’s] best witness as to defending [the Corrigan lawsuit.]”  A. 
327 (second alteration in original). 
 In October 2013, Knight showed his supervisor, Chief Simmons, a document 
prepared by Corrigan addressed to Simmons regarding Knight’s alleged harassment.  
When Simmons was unsuccessful in determining how Knight had accessed the file, the 
University retained Bit-x-Bit, a third-party forensics expert, to investigate how Knight 
gained access.  In January 2014, while the investigation was ongoing, Knight was 
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suspended with pay.  The next month, Bit-x-Bit issued a report detailing which files 
Knight had accessed and when, when his permissions were created, and recommending 
limiting Knight’s access and creating an administrator rights policy.  Several days later, 
at the request of the University, Bit-x-Bit issued a second report that did not contain the 
recommendations regarding Knight.  The report noted that Knight accessed documents 
including texts of emails Corrigan sent to her attorney and to Chief Simmons, and a 
document with a file name “Attorney,” appearing to contain communication between 
Corrigan and her attorney. 
 In February 2014, the University held two pre-disciplinary conferences. At the 
first conference, the University asked Knight to turn over all the documents he had 
accessed.  Knight refused, but turned over some documents after the conference.  At the 
second pre-disciplinary conference Knight provided additional documents.  Knight was 
terminated on March 6, 2014. 
 In its termination letter, the University identified several reasons for Knight’s 
discharge.  First, the University said that Knight violated its computer-use policy1 “by 
failing to act responsibly, use good judgment and exercise civility, and understand the 
appropriate use of assigned IT resources.”  A. 461.  In addition, Knight’s “unauthorized 
access of folders for other Officers was . . . for [his] own personal gain.”  Id.  Moreover, 
                                              
1 The University’s Acceptable Use Policy states that “[u]sers are expected to act 
responsibly.” A. 514.  It prohibits “[u]nauthorized use of another user’s account” and 
“[a]ttempting to gain or gaining unauthorized access to . . . the files of another user.”  A. 
516.  It also prohibits “[u]tilizing university IT resources for purposes other than . . . 
university employment activities or university communications” and states that “IT 
resources cannot be used for personal or financial gain.”  A. 517. 
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Knight had to take affirmative steps and separately log in using his administrator access 
to view the information that he did.  Lastly, Knight did not fully cooperate with the 
investigation, as he did not turn over all information and documents in his possession. 
B. Procedural History 
 
 A few months after he was fired, Knight filed a charge against the University with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  The EEOC dismissed 
Knight’s charge. 
 Knight filed his present lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania on November 19, 2015, alleging that he was terminated in 
retaliation for his participation in the investigation into the complaints by Officers 
Corrigan and Pentz, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
After discovery, Knight and the University each filed motions for summary 
judgment.  The District Court issued an order granting the University’s motion for 
summary judgment and denying Knight’s motion for summary judgment. 
The District Court analyzed the parties’ submissions using the three-step 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach.  This three-part test requires (1) the 
plaintiff to state a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; (2) the burden then 
shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action; and (3) the plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to show that the 
employer’s proffered reason is pretextual.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802-04 (1973).  The District Court granted the University’s motion under step one of 
the test, because it found that Knight had not engaged in a protected activity, and thus 
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failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.  The Court noted that our 
precedent requires an employee participating in a proceeding against an employer’s 
activity to hold an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that the activity he opposes is 
unlawful under Title VII in order to be afforded protection.  Given that Knight did not 
oppose the discrimination, nor contend that he or the University did anything wrong, the 
District Court held Knight could not have had a good faith belief that the underlying 
employer conduct was unlawful. 
 While the Court granted the University’s summary judgment motion under step 
one, it nonetheless addressed steps two and three. The District Court found that under 
step two, the University had offered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating 
Knight.  Specifically, the Court found that the University consistently pointed to Knight’s 
violation of the computer-use policy as the reason for terminating Knight, and that this 
was a legitimate basis for terminating him.  Moreover, under the third step of McDonnell 
Douglas, the District Court held that Knight had failed to demonstrate that the 
University’s legitimate reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. 
This appeal followed. 
II. DISCUSSION  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a grant of 
summary judgment.  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 
144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).  We apply the same standard as the District Court did.  Blair v. 
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 602–03 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment is 
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appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “An issue is genuine only 
if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-
moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the 
suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from retaliating 
against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this subchapter.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach, the District Court 
determined that Knight did not state a prima facie claim of retaliation, and that even if he 
had, he failed to demonstrate that the University’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for terminating his employment was pretextual.  We see no reason to disturb the District 
Court’s well-reasoned ruling.  Although the District Court thoughtfully analyzed each 
step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, we will affirm on a narrower basis.   
Even if we assume Knight had engaged in protected activity, Knight has failed to 
show that the University’s proffered legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for his 
discharge were pretextual.  To preclude summary judgment at this third stage, a “plaintiff 
must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could 
reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) 
Case: 17-3236     Document: 003113096126     Page: 7      Date Filed: 11/28/2018
8 
 
believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the employer’s action.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  The employee “must show[] not merely that the employer’s proffered reason 
was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer’s real 
reason.”  Keller v. Orix Credit All. Inc. 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).  
Knight does not meet this burden.  Under the first prong, Knight argues that the 
University’s termination letter contained numerous inaccuracies and was inconsistent 
with related testimony.  In particular, he avers that the University stated that he had to 
separately log in to access the files, but Lynne Motyl, who wrote the letter, later testified 
in unemployment compensation proceedings that this was not true.  In addition, Knight 
contends that in contrast to the letter’s statement that he accessed the files “for personal 
gain,” Motyl later admitted she was unaware of any personal gain Knight received.  
Lastly, Knight argues that he had access to the files by virtue of his administrative role, 
and thus it is unclear whether he violated the University’s policies. 
These inconsistencies are immaterial and do not approach a showing that the 
University’s reason for his discharge “was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the 
employer’s real reason.”  Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109.  “The plaintiff’s evidence, if it relates 
to the credibility of the employer’s proffered justification, ‘must demonstrate such 
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could 
rationally find them unworthy of credence.’” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 427 
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(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765) (emphasis added and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Knight has not made such a demonstration.   
For instance, although Motyl testified that she was unaware of any improper 
financial gain resulting from Knight’s access to the files, she repeatedly testified as to the 
personal gain to which the letter referred.  See, e.g., A. 150 (“He wanted to win so 
basically he was providing documents or looking at documents [so] that he could protect 
himself and potentially the university.”); A. 153 (“He was preparing a case to protect 
himself because these complainants had filed previous complaints against him 
personally.”). Further, Knight conflates his ability to access the files with the University’s 
authorizing him to access the files.  See A. 516 (prohibiting “gaining unauthorized access 
to . . . the files of another user”).  As the District Court correctly noted, “nothing Plaintiff 
has identified would lead a reasonable factfinder to question that Plaintiff was fired for 
inappropriately accessing the files of other officers.”  A. 659.   
Under the second prong, Knight attempts to establish pretext by showing that 
similarly situated persons, not in the protected class, were treated more favorably.  See 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.  In support, he cites the fact that Motyl conceded the similarity 
of Knight’s actions to those of two other employees, a janitor and Chief Simmons, who 
obtained physical files from co-workers’ desks.  Neither the janitor nor Chief Simmons 
was terminated.  Knight contends that the janitor and Chief Simmons were similarly 
situated, and the only difference is that Knight was engaged in a protected activity.  But 
the undisputed evidence does not support this assertion. 
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Knight’s termination for violating computer-use policy is unlike taking papers 
from a desk. A janitor’s level of responsibilities and accountability regarding University 
resources does not compare to Knight’s administrative position as Parking Manager. 
Moreover, Chief Simmons acted on the advice of counsel and HR when accessing the 
files, whereas Knight concedes that he accessed the files on his own and without 
instruction or consultation.  Knight is therefore not similarly situated to the janitor and 
Chief Simmons.   
On the undisputed record, a reasonable jury could not find a discriminatory 
purpose to be more likely than not the reason for Knight’s termination.  Because Knight 
has not established a genuine issue of material fact, the University was entitled to 
summary judgment.   
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and order. 
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